Abstract In most of the auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one might be interested in hiding these values. Some cryptographically secure protocols for electronic auctions have been presented in the last decade. Our work extends these protocols in several ways. On the basis of garbled circuits, i.e., encrypted circuits, we present protocols for sealed-bid auctions that fulfill the following requirements: 1) protocols are information-theoretically t-private for honest but curious parties; 2) the number of bits that can be learned by malicious adversaries is bounded by the output length of the auction; 3) the computational requirements for participating parties are very low: only random bit choices and bitwise computation of the XOR-function are necessary. Note that one can distinguish between the protocol that generates a garbled circuit for an auction and the protocol to evaluate the auction. In this paper we address both problems. We will present a t-private protocol for the construction of a garbled circuit that reaches the lower bound of 2t + 1 parties, and a more randomness efficient protocol for (t + 1) 2 parties. Finally, we address the problem of bid changes in an auction.
Introduction
Traditional auctions involve an auctioneer and numerous bidders who want to sell or buy an item, respectively. In a secure electronic auction system a bid has to remain hidden from all other bidders and from the auctioneer. In particular, the auctioneer has to be prevented from learning the bid.
There exist numerous different auction types and models. In a sealed-bid auction, every player turns in a secret bid. The auctioneer opens all bids and computes the winner. Hence, the auctioneer learns the bids of all bidders. Dealing with sealed-bids we distinguish between first-price and second-price auctions. In a first-price auction, the highest bidder takes the item and pays the price for his bid, i.e., the highest bid. In a second-price auction also called Vickrey auction the highest bidder takes the item and pays for the second highest bid (see e.g., [1] ).
In this paper, we present protocols for sealed-bid auctions, which keep the privacy of the bidders' bids, even if a collusion of parties tries to attack the protocol. Our work relies on two concepts. First, it relies on the cryptographically privacy preserving auction scheme of Naor et al. [2] , using the garbled circuit (GC) construction, i.e., encrypted Boolean circuits. Second, it relies on the concept of perfect privacy, i.e., on the concept of privacy in the information-theoretic sense [3, 4] . Ishai and Kushilevitz showed how to use the model of garbled circuits to compute a function in a perfect private way [5] . We will generalize both concepts. 1) We present protocols to construct garbled circuits t-privately: the construction does not leak more information to any collusion of up to t parties than the garbled circuit itself.
2) We generalize the concept of garbled circuits such that the garbled circuits will be t-private according to the inputs of the circuit. This implies that any collusion of up to t parties does not get more information about the inputs of the circuit than the collusion can deduce from result of the circuit.
Related Work: Electronic Auction Systems
In 1996, Franklin and Reiter [6] proposed the first auction scheme that has a privacy contribution with regard to the bidders, whereas the auctioneer is allowed to learn all bids. They also demand for a deposit of digital cash from each player to ensure non-repudiation in their cryptographic auction scheme.
Regular Paper
Kikuchi et al. [7] described t-private sealed-bid auctions via a verifiable secret sharing scheme [3, 8] . Their approach deals with n bidders and uses m auctioneers with t < m− 1 3 . The secrets are shared using an error correcting code. Kurosawa and Ogata [9] presented a bit-slice approach for auction circuits. Traditional techniques to evaluate an auction compare the incoming bids one-by-one, but their approach alternatively compares the bids bit-by-bit, beginning with the most significant one. If one combines this approach with the mix and match method of Jakobsson and Juels [10] , then the circuit size can be reduced further. Omote and Miyaji [11] proposed a 1-private second-price sealed-bid auction that satisfies public verifiability of the auction without revealing the highest bid. Brandt [12, 13] introduced a cryptographic auction protocol without a special trusted party. This means, the bidders distributively compute the auction.
Naor et al. [2] presented an electronic auction system based on garbled circuits. Using pseudo-random generators these circuits allow to define a cryptographically secure and verifiable electronic auction system. To construct the garbled circuits the authors introduced a new party called auction issuer. They assumed that the auction issuer did not collude with the auctioneer or a bidder. Juels and Szydlo [14] relied directly on the garbled circuit construction of Naor et al. [2] The proxy oblivious transfer of Naor et al. has the disadvantage that the correct input of a bidder is not verifiable by other parties. Juels and Szydlo introduced a verifiable proxy oblivious transfer resulting in less computation for the bidders.
Related Work: Private Computation
Private computation was introduced by Yao [15] . He considered the problem under cryptographic assumptions. Private Computation with unconditional, i.e., information-theoretically, security has been introduced by Ben-Or et al. [3] and Chaum et al. [4] Chaum et al. proved that any Boolean function can be computed privately, if at most one third of the participating parties are dishonest. For this model, Ben-Or et al. [3] proved that any n-ary Boolean function can be computed n−1 2 -private, i.e., at most n−1 2 players collude. Chor and Kushilevitz [16] showed that if a function can be computed at least n 2 -privately, then it can be computed n-privately as well.
Randomizing polynomials is introduced by Ishai and Kushilevitz [17] as a new algorithmic approach for round-efficient private computations with low error probability. In [5] they have shown that all the functions can privately be computed in a constant number of rounds and with 0 error probability. Damgård and Ishai presented a constant-round protocol for general multiparty computation. It uses randomized polynomials, black-box pseudo-random generators, and Shamir shares [18, 19] . The protocol uses multiplications and additions over a finite field F = GF(2 k ) with security parameter k for construction and evaluation of the polynomials. Damgård and Ishai distinguish between input players, output players, and servers, i.e., parties which construct the randomized polynomials. Hence, this protocol can be used to implement auctions. It is cryptographically secure against a malicious adversary corrupting t < n/3 servers.
Our Contributions
For private electronic auction systems one has to find a concept and protocols for evaluating auctions preserving the privacy of the bidders and the bids.
Our Concept. We generalize the concept of garbled circuits in order to evaluate a circuit t-privately, i.e., no collusion of up to t parties can deduce any knowledge about the inputs of the circuit, that cannot be deduced from the result of the circuit and the input of the colluding parties. Focusing on electronic auction systems fulfills the following requirements.
• In contrast to previous electronic auction systems our system is information-theoretically t-private.
• Some protocols presented in the literature may fail with small probability. Garbled circuits allow evaluation of an auction in a perfectly correct way. In most papers cited above verification is only investigated regarding the bidders and their secret inputs. In our electronic auction system it is possible that all parties t-privately verify the correctness of the auction evaluation. Furthermore, our auction scheme guarantees that the total number of bits of information revealed by a collusion of up to t malicious parties is bounded by the number of output-bits of the auction, even if the malicious parties try to stay undetected .
The Protocols. 1) We present information-theoretically t-private protocols to construct a garbled circuit Γ (C) for a given circuit C. The first protocol requires (t+1)
2 parties and uses a number of random bits that are polynomial in |Γ (C)| and t. The second protocol is based on the first protocol and reaches the lower bound of 2t + 1 parties. In return the second protocol uses an exponential number of additional random bits in t.
2) We present two information-theoretically tprivate protocols for the bidding process.
In our protocols there are four kinds of parties: (i) auctioneer who evaluates the auction, (ii) bidders, (iii) auction issuers who determine the encryption of the auction, and (iv) slaves who perform the encryption. If the parties have access to a source of random bits, the computation performed by auction issuers, bidders and slaves can be implemented by circuits of depth O(log t), that consists of binary XOR-gates and one level of gates to multiplex one bit out of two. Thus, the computational requirements are very low.
Introducing some minor changes to these protocols, one can use them to translate intermediate data of an evaluation process of a garbled circuit into intermediate data of the evaluation process of another garbled circuit of the same circuit. Based on this observation our protocols allow a dynamic sealed-bid auction, i.e., bidders can change their bids at will or they can enter an auction that has already started without further bidders involved in this procedure.
All protocols presented in this paper are information-theoretically t-private. In return the garbled circuit requires a large number of random bits in the encryption of the underlying circuit. But, the protocols for generating the garbled circuits might be useful for generating garbled circuits that are cryptographically t-private. As one can see in [2, 19] these encryptions are often more efficient than informationtheoretically private encryptions. Hence, this paper will be a first step towards an efficient implementation of t-private electronic auction systems with very low requirements for hardware. Our approach is based on [20] .
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some basic definitions and notations of private computation. We will redraw the privacy preserving cryptographic auction of Naor et al. Furthermore, we discuss randomizing polynomials that can be used as an evaluation technique for garbled circuits. Section 3 presents information-theoretically t-private, static auction protocols. In Section 5 we analyze the security of our protocol against active attacks. We dedicate Section 4 and Subsection 5.1 to the proofs of t-privacy and t-security. Section 6 deals with dynamic aspects of the electronic auction system. The concluding Section 7 summarizes the results.
Preliminaries
In this section we refer to the literature and define our notations. In Subsection 2.3, garbled circuits are presented using a compact definition. Throughout this work, we will use ⊕ to denote the (bit-wise) XORoperation on Boolean values and binary strings, as well as on vectors and matrices of binary strings.
Let
n be a binary string of length n. For a set J = {j 1 , . . . , j k } where 1
We extend this notation to arbitrary sequences. Let C = (c 1 , . . . , c n ). Then C[J] denotes the subsequence (c j1 , . . . , c j k ). The operator • denotes the concatenation of strings. For i, j ∈ N, let [i, j] := {i, . . . , j}. All logarithms in this paper are to the base 2.
An n-input l-output circuit C l n is described by a DAG G = (V, E). V contains 2n nodes of in-degree 0, the inputs x 1 ,x 1 , . . . , x n ,x n . The remaining nodes have indegree 2 and are called gates. The gates g 1 , . . . , g m are labeled by either AND or OR. G has l nodes with outdegree 0 called output-gates. For convenience we write C instead of C 1 n and we use the variables x i synonymously for the corresponding input values. If the input of a circuit is fixed by the context, we denote the value of a gate g by b g . The value b e of a wire e is determined by the value of the gate g the wire comes from resp., by the input x i if e is an input wire.
Privacy and Security
In this work we consider both the model of honest but curious parties and the model of malicious parties. We do not want any party to learn more about the inputs of other parties than it can deduce from the result of the function and its own input. We assume that every party has access to a random tape. Parties can send messages to other parties via point-to-point communication using secure channels. Computing a function f on the input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we assume that x i is the private input of party P i . In other words, a protocol is called t-private, 1 t n − 1, if no collusion of t parties learns anything about the distributed secret that cannot be deduced from the result and the input of the members of the collusion, while honestly participating in the protocol. From [21, 22] we can conclude that most auction protocols cannot be run privately on non-2-connected networks. Therefore, we demand a communication network of being at least 2-connected. Alternatively, one can define t-privacy by using conditional entropy. Shannon [23] introduced the entropy function
Definition 1 (t-Privacy). For a subset of parties
He proved that the functions of the class K · H(X) with K > 0 are the only functions that satisfy his requirements for a measure of information generated by a discrete information source. The entropy can also be interpreted as a measure of uncertainty about X. If H(X) = 0 for a discrete random variable X, then we have full information about the outcome of the random experiment related to X. The conditional mutual information
describes the uncertainty about X if we have knowledge about Y . The mutual information
measures the information gain about X knowing Z if we additionally have knowledge about Y . We cannot deduce information about X from Y if and only if I(X ; Y ) = 0. We define the leakage of information of a protocol with respect to U as the minimum value τ such that it holds that
A protocol is t-private if its leakage is 0 with respect to every subset U of at most t parties. We call a protocol P (t, τ )-secure, if for every subset U of at most t parties and for every protocol P , where the parties of U follow P and the honest parties in V \ U follow the protocol P, the leakage is bounded by τ . Note that malicious parties may run an arbitrary attack.
NPS Protocol
In this subsection, we discuss the cryptographic electronic auction system of Naor et al. [2] , that is based on Yao's garbled circuits and pseudo-random generators [24, 25] . Garbled circuits are encrypted versions of standard Boolean circuits where the Boolean values are replaced by encrypted values. Knowing the encrypted input, one can evaluate the circuit gate-bygate. Then one can produce the garbled output without learning anything about the original input and intermediary results. To achieve privacy of an auction Naor et al. [2] introduced a third party: the auction issuer AI. This parties generates the garbled circuit and they assumed that the auction issuer does not conspire with any other parties. To send the encrypted bids to the auctioneer the bidders use a protocol realizing the proxy oblivious transfer. For one-bit bids the proxy oblivious of transfer is defined as follows. Each bidder has his private value x i ∈ {0, 1} and the auction issuer provides two encryptions W 0 , W 1 for the bit. The goal is to send W xi to the auctioneer such that neither the bidder learns W 0 or W 1 nor the auction issuer learns x i . Furthermore, the auctioneer does not learn anything about x i or W 1−xi . Using the garbled circuit, the auctioneer can evaluate the auction. We will refer to this protocol as NPS-protocol.
NPS-protocol provides 1-privacy, only. That means, a party cannot break the secrets of the other parties. But if the auction issuer and the auctioneer collude, both will gain knowledge about all bids.
Garbled Circuits
In this subsection, we shortly discuss garbled circuits. A garbled circuit consists of a circuit of encrypted gates. To encrypt a gate g we XOR the truth table of g by a randomly generated table W g and permute their entries. To compute the result of the encrypted gate we add to the result of predecessor gates the corresponding rows resp., columns of some random tables such that XOR-ing these random values allows us to compute exactly one entry of W g . To keep track of the permutation of the truth table of g, we XOR the results of the predecessor gates by a random bit. Note that this allows us to encrypt the result of the predecessor gates, and simultaneously to permute the truth 
where g 1 denotes the left and g 2 the right predecessor of g.
In every entry of the table, we store a string W g(a⊕rg 1 ,b⊕rg 2 ) g that is used as a key in the table for the succeeding gate. To decrypt a table we use only one half of W g1 , resp., W g2 . Thus, the length of these strings grows exponentially in the depth of the corresponding circuit. But if the circuit has logarithmic depth, the total length of the strings in the garbled circuits is only polynomial in the size of the circuit.
Knowing the encryption W , and gets the encryption of b g and b oi for all output wires o i of g without learning anything about the hidden Boolean value, that is,
Each expression W h oi for a Boolean variable h ∈ {0, 1} can be represented by (h ·W This construction is closely related to the construction of Ishai and Kushilevitz [5] . They presented a construction of garbled circuits based on Boolean formulas. Our construction above is an extension of this approach to Boolean circuits. The proof of correctness and privacy follows analogously to the case of Boolean formulas.
We will now present an alternative way to generate these garbled tables. This strategy will be used in our protocol to generate garbled tables tprivately. For r, r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} and binary strings W
of equal length, we define 
Then, we have
For a given circuit C a garbled circuit is denoted by Γ C . If C is known from the context we will omit the index.
t-Private Garbled Circuit Construction
In this section we will present two protocols for generating a garbled auction circuit Γ , t-privately. We say that a protocol generates a garbled circuit t-privately if it generates a garbled circuit Γ , and while constructing Γ no collusion U of up to t parties can deduce any information about the chosen random values of Γ that cannot be deduced from Γ directly.
Basically our protocol works as follows: for each gate of a circuit we independently generate t + 1 collections of the random bits used in the construction of the corresponding garbled table -each random collection is generated by one separate auction issuer. Instead of computing the garbled auction circuit by the auction issuers we proceed as follows: we introduce a field of (t + 1) 2 slaves that is divided into t + 1 columns, where the i-th column is used for permuting all truth tables according to the random permutation chosen by the ith auction issuer. The truth tables and the corresponding W -strings of each auction issuer and of each gate move through all columns of the field. At the end the tables of all auction issuers are permuted by the same permutation. XOR-ing all corresponding tables gives us the desired t-private garbled circuit.
Our protocols are designed such that every party can simultaneously take part in the construction of the garbled circuit, bidding and evaluation. Hence, every party can simultaneously be the auctioneer, one auction issuer, one slave, as well as an arbitrary number of bidders, without gaining additional knowledge about the bids of the other bidders. Hence, if it is not necessary to distinguish between the different entities we call them just parties.
In the following, we use the term -a party P generates an -share w 1 , . . . , w of w to denote that party P generates random strings w 1 , . . . , w such that
Since most proofs of our theorems and lemmas are quite long and technical, we will give the proofs in a separate section. In the following we will present our main protocols.
Constructing Garbled Circuits
In the first strategy we will use a set of t + 1 auction issuers AI k with k ∈ [1, t+1] and a (t+1)×(t+1)-array of (t + 1) 2 sub-workers S i,j with i, j ∈ [1, t + 1] called slaves. Every auction issuer generates an independent garbled circuit Γ k for a globally given auction circuit C. The slaves are used for combining these garbled circuits. More precisely:
• AI k generates two random strings W
k,e for every wire e,
• a random bit r k,g for every gate g, and a random bit r k,i for every input variable x i . For easier notion, we associate with every wire e the random bit r k,g of the gate g resp., r k,i of the input variable x i where the wire is coming from. Let r k,e denote this random bit. After generating the random values, all AI k put these random values together into the ungarbled tables Q k,g of every gate g and the ungarbled vectors W k,e of every wire e of C:
and
For technical reasons the auction issuers AI k choose the table entries as follows: where o 1 , . . . , o m denote the output wires of g.
Our goal is to construct Γ and thus all tables 
and 
where e 1 , e 2 are the input wires of g, and send Q k,g to the auctioneer A.
(b) Finally, A computes
k=1 Q k,g . We call this protocol the field-protocol. The fieldprotocol can be simulated on a complete network of 2t + 1 parties. 
Slave-Efficient Protocol
We will now present a t-private protocol that generates the garbled circuit Γ by using t + 1 auction issuers and t slaves. Note that this number of parties matches the number of parties that are needed to compute a function t-privately if the function has an embedded OR-function [26] , and therefore, it is optimal in the number of parties.
To present our protocol we will proceed in two steps. In the first step, we will present a protocol for constructing a garbled circuit, where every slave receives messages only from another corresponding slave. This protocol uses an exponential number of slaves. In the second step, we will show that this protocol can be simulated by 2t + 1 parties.
The following protocol is closely related to the protocol discussed in the last section. In the first step the t + 1 auction issuers AI k generate the tables Q k,g , the vectors W k,e , and the random bits r k,e as in the protocol above.
Our protocol starts by generating shares of
t-privately. This will be done by using t + 1 virtual t + 1-ary complete trees T 1 , . . . , T t+1 of depth t. Later, these virtual trees will represent ways of communication within a complete network of 2t + 1 nodes. The nodes of a virtual tree will be mapped to the complete network.
We denote the nodes of T k by S We will now describe the tree-protocol that runs on the trees T k . Afterwards we will show how to implement this protocol by using only 2t + 1 parties without losing t-privacy. The tree-protocol runs as follows. 
1) Distributing Phase
All AI i generate for all random bits r i,e and every node S u k of T k a random bit r u i,k,e such that r i,e = ⊕ u is a prefix of σ r u i,k,e for every leaf S σ k . Then, the AI i send r u i,k,e to S u k and every node S u k computes su k,e = ⊕ t+1 i=1 r u i,k,e .
2) Permuting Phase
and sends the resulting tables to A.
(c) Finally, A computes the garbled table
Note that we can run the tree-protocol for all the t + 1 virtual trees on
nodes. Lemma 4. The tree-protocol gives a t-private construction of the garbled circuit Γ using
parties.
In the following we will show that we can simulate the tree-protocol by a network of 2t+1 parties such that our protocol is still t-private. We will call the resulting protocol the slave-efficient-protocol. To distinguish between the parties used in the tree-protocol and the parties used in the slave-efficient-protocol we call the former virtual parties and the latter real parties. In the simulation we will guarantee the following properties: 1) no real party simulates two virtual parties on the same root-leaf path, i.e., for every path σ ∈ [1, t
t−1 and all
are simulated by different parties; and 3) the roots of the virtual trees are simulated by different real parties. The privacy proof of the slave-efficient-protocol will be based on these properties.
Recall that there are t + 1 trees. For k ∈ [1, t + 1] the auction issuer AI k = S λ k is the root of the (t + 1)-ary complete tree T k .
Inductively, we show that 2t + 1 parties are sufficient to realize a mapping from the virtual parties to the real parties, which fulfills the properties required above.
1) As mentioned above, the auction issuers AI k , k ∈ [1, t + 1], simulate the roots S λ k of the trees T k . Hence, we need t + 1 parties for these simulation steps.
2) Assume that we can simulate the subtrees T k of all T k with nodes S 
. , t + 1}
+1 . 3) Since the virtual trees T k have depth t, our simulation uses 2t + 1 real parties. Furthermore, from the construction above it follows, that the simulation fulfills the three properties from the above. From the three properties of our simulation it follows that:
Theorem 5. There is a t-private protocol to build Γ for 2t + 1 parties using O ((t + 1) t+3 |Γ |) random bits. Recall that the parameter t does not limit the number of users of the protocol. In fact t denotes the number of untrusted parties within the subset of parties that generate the garbled circuit.
t-Private Bidding
Let x i,j denote the j-th bit of the bid x i of bidder B i and let e be a wire of the circuit C connected to x i,j . Our protocol should give the auctioneer A access to W After the bidding the auctioneer can easily evaluate the garbled circuit and therefore determine the value of this circuit. This can be done gate by gate using the formula given in (1) . Note that this formula gives us the encrypted value of the corresponding gate and the keys to compute the encrypted values of the direct successors of the gate. Since the evaluation of the garbled circuit on the encrypted inputs gives an encrypted output, the result of the auction remains hidden. To decrypted the output all auction issuers AI i have to publish their random bits r i,g for every output gate g.
Theorem 6. There exists a t-private protocol for an electronic auction system with t + 1 auction issuers and (t + 1)
2 slaves using O(t 3 |Γ |) random bits. The protocol for the bidding phase for our slave efficient protocol works analogously to the bidding protocol presented above. To evaluate the garbled circuit we can again use the formula given in (1).
Theorem 7. There exists a t-private protocol for an electronic auction system with t + 1 auction issuers and t slaves using O((t + 1)
t+3 |Γ |) random bits.
Proofs of Privacy of Our Protocols
In this section we will prove our theorems presented in the previous section. The proofs of t-privacy are based on some structural properties. Proof. By the pigeon hole principle it follows that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , t + 1} such that the auction issuer AI i and all slaves in columns S 1,i , . . . , S t+1,i are honest, i.e., they are not members of the collusion. Analogously, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , t + 1} such that all slaves in row S j,1 , . . . , S j,t+1 are honest.
Definition 10. Let U be a collusion of at most t parties. Then, a trusted skeleton (TS) of the fieldprotocol consists of the honest auction issuer AI i , the honest slaves in S ·,i and S j,· , and all honest bidders. The extended collusion (EC) consists of the auctioneer and the remaining auction issuers, slaves, and bidders that are not in trusted skeleton. The sets [TS] ⊆ TS × TS, [EC] ⊆ EC × EC, [χ] ⊆ (TS × EC \ {A}) ∪ (EC \ {A} × TS), [SA] = {(S j,t+1 , A)}, and
[AIA] = {(AI i , A), (A, AI i )}
consist of all (sender, receiver)-pairs from the corresponding domains that exchange messages in the fieldprotocol.
[TS] describes the communication channels between all members in the trusted skeleton, [EC] between all members in the extended collusion, [χ] between members of trusted skeleton and extended collusion without the auctioneer, [SA] between the honest slave in the last column and the auctioneer, and [AIA] between the honest auction issuer AI i and the auctioneer A.
Due to arguments of symmetry, we can permute the numbering of rows and auction issuer such that row i does not belong to the collusion.
We will now define the trusted skeleton of the slaveefficient protocol. 3) the roots of the virtual trees are simulated by different real parties. Hence, by the pigeon hole principle it follows, that for every virtual non-leaf node of every virtual tree there exists a direct successor that is simulated by an honest real party. Moreover, since all roots are simulated by different real parties, there exists at least one root S λ i = AI i that is simulated by an honest real party. From the former observation it follows, that there exists a root-leaf path in the virtual tree T i where every virtual party on this path will be simulated by the honest real party. Analogously, it follows that for every virtual tree T i and every node u of T i that is simulated by the honest real party, there exists a path from u to a leaf of T i such that every virtual party on this path will be simulated by the honest real party.
Since there are t+1 virtual parties on each root-leafpath of every virtual tree and these virtual parties are simulated by t + 1 real parties, at least one of these real parties is honest. 
t-Privacy of the Auction Protocols
Our privacy proofs are based on the following idea. We analyze the random variable C describing the communication between the trusted skeleton and the extended collusion. Assume that an adversary controlling the extended collusion can generate a random variable S, that is indistinguishable from C only by knowing the garbled circuit and the random bits chosen by the parties of the extended collusion. Then, the adversary cannot deduce any knowledge from the C and Γ that cannot be deduced from Γ .
Let R i be a discrete random variable describing the sequence of the random variables W i,e and r i,e for all wires e of the auction issuer AI i of the trusted skeleton. Analogously, let R ¬i describe the sequence of the random variables W i,e and r i,e for all wires e of the auction issuer of the extended collusion. Furthermore, we interpret Γ into a discrete random variable for the generated garbled circuit. Let R EC resp., R T S be the discrete random variables describing all other random bits uniformly chosen by the extended collusion resp., the trusted skeleton. Let U be a uniformly distributed discrete random variable over binary strings of an adequate length. Let C(R i , R ¬i , R T S , R EC , Γ ) be a binary description of the communication between the extended collusion and the trusted skeleton generated by a run of the field-protocol. The random choices of the parties are given by R i , R ¬i , R T S , R EC and the generated garbled circuit is given by Γ . Finally, let Sim(U, R ¬i , R EC , Γ ) be a binary description of a communication string generated by a simulator that works as follows.
• The simulator performs the same operations as the auction issuers and slaves of the extended collusion. During this simulation the random choices of the parties in the extended collusion are taken from R ¬i and R EC .
• We divide the strings given by U into disjoint blocks of adequate length. Any message sent through [χ] from a party of the trusted skeleton to a party of the extended collusion is given by a separate block of U , i.e., these messages are independent and uniformly chosen.
• Any message sent through [χ] from a party P of the extended collusion to a party of the trusted skeleton is computed by the simulation described above, i.e., we simulate the operations performed by P on the messages received by P in the simulation and on the random choices of P given by R ¬i and R EC .
• 
Proof. We fix any message sent through [χ] from a party in the trusted skeleton to a party of the extended collusion. Recall that this message must be an element of a (t + 1)-share such that at least one element sh of this (t + 1)-share is only sent to a member of the trusted skeleton. sh is determined by R T S . The t elements of the (t + 1)-share sent from a party in the trusted skeleton to a party of the extended collusion are independently and uniformly chosen. That means, a certain message sent from a party in the trusted skeleton to a party of the extended collusion is chosen with probability 1/2 |sh| . In both settings -using the simulator resp., using the real protocol -all messages sent from a party of the extended collusion to a party of the trusted skeleton through [χ] are determined by the messages sent from a party of the trusted skeleton to a party of the extended collusion through [χ] and by U resp., R EC . Note that both U and R EC are independently and uniformly distributed.
The simulator and the protocol compute the messages from all auction issuers AI j of the extended collusion deterministically using r ¬i and r ec . Since all strings are uniformly distributed, those messages are equally distributed.
Furthermore, in both settings the messages sent from the slaves S ·,t+1 in the last column are fully determined by Γ , R EC , and the messages previously received by the slaves S ·,t+1 . As seen above these messages only depend on U resp., R EC . Thus, the messages sent from the slaves S ·,t+1 to the auctioneer A are uniformly distributed in both settings.
Hence,
Proof of Theorem 3. For the t-privacy we show that
That means, the communication string seen by the extended collusion (here described by C for short) gives no additional knowledge about the content of R i chosen by AI i for the garbled circuit, if an adversary controlling the extended collusion knows the generated garbled circuit Γ and the random values chosen by the parties of the extended collusion.
I(C; R
where
Using Lemma 14 it holds that
Since U and R i are uniformly distributed and independent of each other, it holds that
Since R EC and R ¬i are independently chosen from R i they do not provide any information about R i . Thus, the adversary controlling the extended collusion can only deduce information about R i from the garbled circuit Γ (resp., from the shares of Γ that are sent from S i,t+1 to the auctioneer). By construction Γ (resp., the shares of Γ from S i,t+1 ) is a garbled circuit and gives no information about the values chosen from AI i . As no further communication takes place, the construction of Γ is t-private. Finally, let us denote that the number of participating parties and the number of used random bits directly follow from the protocol.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since each tree T k is a (t + 1)-ary tree of depth t, T k consists of
nodes. Thus, we can set up each tree such that each party controls at least one node in T k .
Let U be a collusion of at most t parties. We say there exists a trusted skeleton (TS) of the tree-protocol according to U , if
• there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , t + 1} such that the root of T i is not in U ;
• for every k ∈ {1, . . . , t+1} and every root-leaf path in T k there exists a honest party on this path;
• for every tree T i and every honest node u of T i there exists a u-leaf path in T i such that every party on this path is honest. This also follows from the fact that each internal node must have at least one honest successor. It is easy to verify that a trusted skeleton of the treeprotocol according to a collusion of at most t parties always exists.
Let V denote a trusted skeleton and then we call the remaining parties the extended collusion (EC). We denote the set of communication channels between the parties of the trusted skeleton and the parties of the extended collusion except of the auctioneer as [χ] .
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3 we can introduce a simulator that uniformly chooses random strings for the messages sent through the channels of [χ] . Furthermore, the messages sent to the auctioneer A deterministically depend on Γ , the random bits of the extended collusion, and the messages sent through [χ] .
Since for each (t + 1)-share that is computed in the tree-protocol at least one element is send to a member of the trusted skeleton, we can prove a result analogous to Lemma 14 for the tree-protocol. Thus, the communication does not provide any information about the choices for r i,e , W i,e , Q i,g for all wires e and gates g.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let us consider a trusted skeleton for the slave-efficient protocol. If we take the inverse of the mapping of the virtual parties of the treeprotocol to the real parties of the slave-efficient protocol as defined in Subsection 3.2, one can see that we get a trusted skeleton for the tree-protocol as defined in Lemma 4. Since an adversary that controls the extended collusion of the tree-protocol receives the same messages as another adversary that controls the corresponding extended collusion of the slave-efficient protocol, both adversaries can deduce the same information. For Lemma 4 we can deduce that our protocol gives a t-private construction of Γ by using 2t + 1 parties.
t-Private Bidding
Proof of Theorem 6. In the bidding process there exist (at least) one auction issuer AI i and two slaves S 1,i , S j,t+1 that are members of the trusted skeleton of the field-protocol. We fix Γ and all random strings of the extended collusion. Using the simulator argument, we can see that all communication seen by the extended collusion does give neither any information about the random strings of the trusted skeleton nor of the honest bidders: in Steps 1 and 2 the bidders, resp., the auction issuers, generate (t + 1)-shares. One element of each (t + 1)-share is sent to a member of the trusted skeleton. Thus, the other shares are only random strings (see Lemma 14) . In Steps 3 and 4, c e is computed and W Proof. The proof follows analogously to the proof of Lemma 2. It is based on counting the number of different values for the random variables R i of the auction issuer in the trusted skeleton, such that R i ∪R ¬i defines the same shape Γ of the garbled circuit and the same values W ce k,t+1,e • c e of the encrypted input bits x i,j . In the first step we evaluate the garbled circuit. One can see that this evaluation determines exactly one of the four entries of each garbled table. Since, our goal is to find a fixed but arbitrary garbled 
From the lemma above we can conclude that we cannot deduce any additional knowledge about the unknown input bits of the bidders in the trusted skeleton from the garbled circuit Γ and the encrypted input bits W ce k,t+1,e • c e . Since the communication in the bidding process is independent of the communication in the field-protocol if the garbled circuit is given, the bidding and the evaluation processes do not provide any further information about the input bids of the trusted skeleton.
The correctness of the bidding process follows from the fact that
Finally, for all output gates o the permutation bits r i,o are sent to the auctioneer at the end of the auction. Then, the auctioneer is able to reveal the result of the auction. Thus, the auction system provides only the same information to the extended collusion as the collusion can deduce from the result of the auction.
For the tree-protocol and the slave-efficient-protocol the bidding process runs analogously to our protocol for (t + 1)
2 slaves, if we replace the slaves S 1,i and S i,t+1 by AI i .
Proof of Theorem 7. As in the bidding process of the field-protocol at least one auction issuer AI i and one leaf S σ j belong to the trusted skeleton of the slaveefficient protocol. Furthermore, there are only 2t + 1 parties that are involved in the bidding process of the field-protocol. Due to the t-privacy slave-efficient protocol, this claim follows analogously to the proof of Theorem 6.
Security Against Active Attacks
If a node is malicious (Byzantine), then it does not need to follow the instructions of the protocol. It can arbitrarily drop, add, or change messages. We define an active collusion as a collusion of t malicious nodes that are under control of a single active adversary. Thus, the active adversary knows all information gathered by the colluding nodes and he can arbitrarily instruct these nodes.
One can think of different aims the adversary tries to achieve when it attacks our field protocol.
1) The adversary may try to change the outcome of the auction systematically.
2) The adversary is destructive, i.e., he tries to sabotage the execution or changes the result of the computation at random. To make our field protocol resistant against these types of attacks we can construct the garbled circuit redundantly.
3) The aim of the third kind of adversary is to collect as much of the information about the inputs as possible by manipulating messages.
In the following we focus on an upper bound for the leakage of the field-protocol to every kind of adversaries. We will show that the following theorem holds even in the case that the adversary controls all parties in the extended collusion (Definition 10).
Theorem 16. Let l be the number of output bits of C. Then, an active adversary does not get more than l bits of information about the input bits of the bidders of the trusted skeleton, i.e., the protocol is (t, l)-secure.
Assume that an adversary does not want to change the result of an auction, but tries to gain some additional information. Then, the theorem above gives us even more:
Corollary 17.
An active adversary that controls at most t parties without changing the output of an auction does not get any information about the bids of the honest bidders that cannot be deduced by a passive adversary controlling the same parties.
Consequently, if the adversaries do not want to change the output of the auction our field protocol is secure against active adversaries.
Proof of Theorem 16
To prove Theorem 16 we will investigate the communication between a trusted skeleton of the parties in the network and all remaining parties. To simplify our proof, we will make the following changes of the distributing phase at the field-protocol.
For every h, i, e, after a slave S h,i has computed s i,e he sends s h,i to all slaves S j,i in column i. After he has received all values s i,e from the slaves in column i, he verifies that all of these values are equal. Note that such a verification is not necessary if we consider passive adversaries only.
Analyzing our field-protocols for generating a garbled circuit and for the bidding, one can see that one can simulate an active adversary by using only one party that deviates from the presented protocols. All remaining deviations from the protocols can be simulated by XOR-ing some strings with the resulting garbled circuit or with the strings sent by the single party that deviates from the presented protocols. Note that a malicious bidder can be simulated by an honest bidder by changing its bid. Summarizing we get:
Fact 18. Assume that all slaves S j,i of row i are members of the trusted skeleton. Then, every attack of an active adversary can be simulated by a passive adversary using the same extended collusion where only S i−1,i−1 , resp., AI 2 if i = 1, deviates from the given protocols.
In the following we will assume that all parties except the party S i−1,i−1 , resp., AI 2 , emphasized in Fact 18 follow the protocol. We will call this party the malicious party. Note that all remaining parties expect the malicious party to send a fixed number of bits that are assumed to be shares of the permuted vectors
and of the permuted tables g(a, b) ). We divide the communication between the extended collusion and the trusted skeleton into three parts:
• the messages sent in the construction of the garbled circuit and the bidding by a party that is not a slave of the last column (through [χ]), i.e., all messages except the messages sent by S i,t+1 ∈ TS ;
• the messages sent in for the construction of the garbled circuit and the bidding by S i,t+1 ∈ TS (through [SA]); and
• the messages sent by the action issuer AI i ∈ TS to decrypt the result of the garbled circuit (through [AIA]), i.e., the random bits r i,o for all output gates o.
We will denote these parts of the communication by C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 . Note that C 1 only consists of independent randomly chosen binary strings. Hence, it is not possible that any adversary can deduce any information from C 1 . For a circuit of output gates C 3 consists of bits, and hence, an adversary can deduce at most bits of information from these bits. In the remaining part of the section we will show that an adversary cannot deduce any information from C 1 and C 2 .
After finishing C 1 and C 2 the adversary receives
• c e , for every input wire e with input bit x i,j . From the construction of the garbled circuit it follows that every combination of binary strings of adequate length may occur for 
) are given. Hence, the adversary cannot deduce any information from C 1 and C 2 .
Since C 3 consists of bits Theorem 16 follows directly.
Dynamic t-Private Auctions
We call an electronic auction system dynamic if it allows a bidder to change his bid and if bidders can join a running auction. Introducing dynamism into a electronic auction system may lead to two scenarios. 1) A bidder gets feedback whether his bid changes the result of the auction. Hence, he gets additional information about the bids of the other bidders.
2) A bidder does not get any feedback. Then, dynamism can be reduced to the static case where only the last bid of each bidder is used.
Talking about a dynamic secure electronic auction system, we assume that the system works as follows.
1) The system generates an algorithm that allows evaluation of the auction without revealing any information about the bids. Our system will compute an encrypted result.
2) The bidders can deposit their bids in such a way that no party gets any information about the values of the bids (at this moment).
3) If a bidder changes his bid all other bidders can stay inactive. 4) If a bidder is paying some fee, he will get the information whether he is the winner of the auction at this moment.
5) A bidder can withdraw or change his bid such that no party gets any information about the value of his bid (at this moment). Note that combining the last two requirements results in some leakage (one bit) of information about the bids of the remaining bidders. But, one can assume that the fee makes this bit of information very expensive.
Let us first investigate whether we can recycle a garbled table of a gate for evaluating a circuit on two different inputs. In general, we have to give a negative answer. For a Boolean circuit C and two binary inputs x, x ∈ {0, 1} n of C with C(x) = C(x ), let ∆(x, x ) be the set of input variables with different values in x and x . Furthermore, for a subset of input variables X let Λ C (x, X) be the set of gates g such that for some x, x with C(x) = C(x ) and ∆(x, x ) ⊆ X, the value of g is different on x and x . g , r g are not chosen independently in Γ and in Γ for all gates g ∈ Λ C (x, X), then one can observe whether the value of g changes from x to x .
Let B i be a bidder that has announced to change his bid, i.e., X = {x i,1 , x i,2 , . . .}. Our goal is to find a protocol that allows all bidders B j = B i to stay inactive. Let Γ be the garbled circuits used on the old bids, and let Γ be the garbled circuits used on the changed bids. From our observation above one can conclude that all random values W 0 g , W 1 g , r g in Γ and in Γ with g ∈ x∈{0,1} n Λ C (x, X) have to be chosen independently. Hence, we can run our protocols for all gates g ∈ Λ C (X) = x∈{0,1} n Λ C (x, X) and all wires leaving these gates. Since the values of the gates g ∈ Λ C (X) do not change their values for every input x and x with ∆(x, x ) ∈ X we can recycle the random values W 0 g , W 1 g , r g from Γ in Γ . Note that for these garbled circuits Γ and Γ the intermediary strings W be e •(b e ⊕r e ) on the wires that are leaving gates g ∈ Λ C (X) are the same for every pair of input x and x with ∆(x, x ) ∈ X. Hence, we only have to reevaluate the gates in Λ C (X). This can be done by running a new bidding process for B i and running a new evaluation process of Γ by the auctioneer A. Proof. Assume that there are d bid changes that occur successively. In the following we fix the bid change. Let X be the set of input gates that may change their values in the -th bid change. Since for every input x and x with ∆(x, x ) ∈ X the values of the gates g ∈ Λ C (x, X ) do not change their values, we can recycle the random values W 0 g , W 1 g , r g from Γ in the modified circuit Γ . For all gates g ∈ Λ C (x, X ) new garbled tables have to be constructed t-privately with respect to the recently generated strings W e and permutation bits r k,e . To reevaluate the circuit the bidders transfer their changed bids using the t-private bidding protocol. The tree-protocol and the slave-efficient-protocol can be modified in a similar way. Note that those bidders who do not change their bids remain inactive whenever a bid changes. The t-privacy of the protocols for bidding and for the construction of the modified garbled circuits (see Theorems 3, 5, 6 , and 7) implies the t-privacy of the protocols for bid-changes.
We have to reconstruct O( t+3 |Γ |) random bits for the tree-protocol and for the slave-efficient-protocol.
We can use a similar protocol to extend a garbled circuit for an auction from n to n + 1 bidders, if the comparison of the bids can be described by an associative operator with a neutral element. In this case, we generate in the beginning a garbled circuit for the auction system with at least one dummy bidder that gives a neutral bid. If a new bidder joins the auction, we can simply add a subcircuit to the existing one for the new bidder and a new dummy bidder that replaces the old dummy bidder with his neutral bid. To generate a resulting garbled circuit, one can run a protocol similar to our protocol for changing a bid of an existing bidder.
Note that if changing bids goes along with a change of the circuit, e.g., the new bid may require more bits than the old one, then our strategy above fails. In this case we have to construct a completely new garbled circuit Γ . To translate the encrypted bids of the passive bidders B j = B i from the previous encryption of Γ we can run a protocol similar to the bidding protocol. Then, for an input gate g of B j the auctioneer (additionally) performs the role of the bidder. Furthermore, the auctioneer uses r g ⊕ b g instead of the input x i,j . The bits r k,g of the auction issuers AI k are replaced by r k,g ⊕r k,g . So, we can translate the string W r g ) of Γ . This strategy can also be used to extend a given garbled circuit from n to n + 1 bidders.
The t-privacy of the protocols for bidding and for the construction of the modified garbled circuits (see Theorems 3, 5, 6, and 7) implies the t-privacy of the protocols for bid-changes and for extending a given garbled circuit. This implies: 
Conclusions
In this paper we present a t-private protocol for 2t+1 parties and a more randomness efficient t-private protocol for O(t 2 ) parties for sealed bid auctions. Our protocols are based on garbled circuits for evaluating the auction, and on strategies for constructing such a circuit in a distributed way. Usually, the bidder-toauctioneer connection is the bottleneck of an electronic auction system, e.g., the bidder has a limited bandwidth or he is not always available. Thus, we postulate that bidders have to be involved as infrequently as possible. In our system a bidder must only be online to bid and can stay passive during the remaining time. This feature also holds for dynamic auctions where bids are changed or bidders join a running auction. Finally, we analyze the information gain of Byzantine attackers on our electronic auction system. We present a strategy for introducing dynamism into such an electronic auction system.
